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Abstract 
International level crossing statistics reveal that the majority of accidents at level 
crossings occur due to human error on the part of car drivers. Often, the rather unspecific 
description of “attentional deficits” is given as the cause of most accidents. In this study, driving 
data and eye-tracking data were collected during a standardized driving study. Using a research 
vehicle, the behavior of 24 participants was observed while approaching two level crossings (one 
with passive protection, the other with active light-signal protection). It turned out that on the last 
300m of the approach towards level crossings, all of the drivers detected and fixated upon at least 
parts of the protection layout at both level crossings. Nevertheless, only one third of all 
participants subsequently derived the right reaction and checked the rails for an oncoming train. 
Two thirds of the participants did not direct their attention towards the rail tracks. With such 
deficient gaze behavior, visual detection of a potentially oncoming train is difficult. In addition to 
the maladaptive gaze patterns, inattentive drivers decelerated significantly less while approaching 
both level crossings than attentive drivers. 
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1. Introduction 
National laws on level crossings usually contain a paragraph that states that railway level 
crossings should consistently be designed in a way that makes the priority of the rail transport 
over road traffic clearly visible (e.g. DB Netz AG, 2002). To fulfill this requirement, level 
crossings are equipped with different combinations of roadside signs, sometimes with additional 
technical systems like light signals and/or barriers, to emphasize the priority of crossing trains 
over road traffic users. Despite special signs and signals, road users do not always respect the 
train’s right of way. Accidents at level crossings remain an ongoing international issue. Even 
though collisions at level crossings only account for a fraction of the total number of road traffic 
accidents, these accidents are particularly relevant because of the severe injuries and property 
damage they cause. Most level crossing accidents involve a motorized road user who collides 
with a train. 95% of all collisions between road users and rail vehicles in Germany originate from 
the misconduct of a road user (DB Netz AG, 2012). The accidents are often blamed on 
“inattentive driving behavior” on the part of the road user or a “lack of knowledge” about rules 
and regulations concerning level crossings and driving characteristics of trains. Since this 
description of the human error is rather unspecific and often not verified, it appears necessary to 
put more effort into the analysis of human information processing during the approach towards 
level crossings. Research on this subject has been conducted by Rudin-Brown, French-St. George 
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and Stuart (2014), who describe human factors that can lead to unsafe situations at rural level 
crossings. On a general level, perception (detection of a train) and cognition (understanding the 
need to stop) are distinguished as central factors in the task of using a level crossing. Underlying 
factors that were identified as having an influence on perception at level crossings were 
sightlines, train conspicuity, the unchanged retinal image of an approaching train (making 
detection difficult and leading to an underestimation of the train’s speed) and difficulties with the 
train horn audibility. Underlying factors related to the driver’s decision making were the so-
called “looked-but-failed-to-see error”, the faulty activation of correct schemas and mental 
models connected to appropriate behavior at a level crossing, distraction, driver impairment and 
information processing. The “looked-but-failed-to-see error” describes a situation in which 
drivers fail to identify hazards despite looking at the hazard’s source, due to limitations in human 
information processing. The factor “faulty activation of schemas” is characterized by learned 
misbehavior and maladaptive expectations, resulting from the infrequent occurrence of a train at 
many level crossings. 
A lot of psychological models exist that appear suitable to integrate human-factor issues that 
lead to unsafe conditions at level crossings, like the ones described by Rudin-Brown, French-St. 
George and Stuart (2014) in terms of human information processing (e.g. Broadbent, 1957, 
Kahneman, 1973, Wickens & Hollands, 1999). In their model of information processing, 
Wickens and Hollands (1999) describe a sequence of steps, starting with early sensory perception 
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and progressing to higher cognitive processing, that are passed before an action can be initiated. 
This model can be adapted to a road user’s approach towards a level crossing (figure 1).  
Figure 1: Necessary cognitive steps for passing a level crossing (LX)  
First, drivers have to detect at least some parts of the safety layout of a level crossing (e.g. 
signs). Second, they have to identify these parts correctly as referring to a level crossing. Third, 
once identified, schemas and scripts connected to passing a level crossing have to be retrieved 
from the long-term memory. Fourth, an action intention, matching the current situation at the 
level crossing, has to be formed, based on the knowledge retrieved earlier. Fifth, the driver has to 
execute the intended action. In the case of the (especially passive) level crossing this means that 
he has to reduce the speed of the vehicle in order to listen and visually check the rails for 
oncoming trains and to stop if necessary. The amount of attention that the driver can invest in the 
task of crossing the level crossing influences information processing in each single step and can 
be reduced by distractions in the environment. 
In several studies, aspects of driving behavior and attention during the approach towards 
level crossings have been investigated in different settings and countries (Åberg, 1988, Rudin-
Brown, Lenné, Edquist, & Navarro 2012, Wigglesworth, 1978). Wigglesworth (1978) observed 
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driver’s behavior at level crossings in Australia with a focus on head movements that served as 
an indicator of the quality of the search for a potentially oncoming train during the approach 
towards a level crossing. Two observers surveyed driver’s head movements at 14 passive and six 
active level crossings. All active level crossings were equipped with flashing lights. The results 
reveal that a majority of drivers did not search and look for a train. Especially in the case of level 
crossings with flashing lights, 72% of the drivers (375 out of 522 drivers) paid attention to neither 
the tracks to the left nor the tracks to the right. At passive level crossings, 40% of the observed 
drivers (181 out of 451 drivers) did not show any head movements. With a comparable method, 
Åberg (1988) observed a total of 584 drivers at 16 different level crossings in Sweden. 14 of 
these level crossings were equipped with an active protection system consisting of flashing red 
lights on either side of the road. The other two level crossings in Åberg’s study were protected 
with gates. In order to evaluate the gaze direction of drivers, two observers monitored the head 
movements of drivers, one on each side of the highway leading towards the level crossing. Of the 
584 drivers, 145 drivers (24.8%) checked both sides of the level crossing for an oncoming train, 
whereas 394 (59.8%) showed no head movements to either side. 90 drivers (15.4%) looked at the 
rails to the left or right at the level crossing, but did not search for a train on either side. 
Rudin-Brown, Lenné, Edquist, & Navarro (2012) analyzed the driving behavior and the 
subjective perception of 25 participants during their approach towards three different Australian 
level crossings in a driving simulator setup. One of the simulated level crossings was protected 
with flashing lights and half barriers, one was equipped with traffic lights only and one had 
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passive protection including the St Andrew’s cross and stop signs. Amongst other measures, the 
driving performance and attention of the drivers was analyzed by comparing the number of 
violations at the three level crossings, reviewing the speed profiles and evaluating visual scanning 
patterns of drivers. A behavior was classified as a violation whenever the minimum speed of the 
vehicle in the simulation exceeded 10 km/h in front of a level crossing. 14 out of 25 participants 
committed a violation in the case of the passive protection with stop sign, seven in the case of the 
half-barrier-protected level crossing and five violations were recorded in the case of the level 
crossing with light signals. Speed profiles of the last 280m of the approach towards each level 
crossing were compared for the drivers that did not commit a violation. A significant difference 
in the speed profile was found between the level crossing with flashing lights and half barriers 
and the passive level crossing with stop signs. Another significant difference in the speed profile 
was found between the level crossing with light signals and the level crossing with stop signs. 
Speed profile results show that, compared to the two other level crossings, drivers slowed down 
earlier on approach towards the level crossing with stop signs. In addition to the driving data, 
visual scanning patterns of the participants were recorded. No significant difference could be 
found in the time spent looking at the central regions compared to the peripheral regions of the 
visual scene on approach to the three level crossings. These findings are in conflict with the 
findings of Wigglesworth (1978), who reported a different proportion of drivers that direct their 
attention to peripheral locations when comparing passive level crossings to active level crossings 
with flashing light signals. This could be due to the relatively small sample size used by Rudin-
Brown, Lenné, Edquist, & Navarro (2012). 
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As a perspective for further research, Wigglesworth (1978) formulated two hypotheses 
concerning inadequate behavior of drivers in his sample. A possible explanation for the absence 
of adequate searching behavior could be that drivers are not aware of the existence of a level 
crossing because they fail to perceive it or the signs announcing it. An alternative explanation 
could be that drivers manage to detect the level crossing, but subsequently form wrong 
expectations because of faulty mental models or a lack of knowledge about level crossings in 
general. 
This paper reports on an eye-tracking study that was designed to test these explanations 
with drivers who approach two different level crossings in a field study. It was evaluated whether 
drivers pay visual attention to signs and signals and subsequently derive the appropriate 
behavioral patterns: to reduce speed and to check whether a train is approaching. The use of eye 
tracking in this field study allows a more detailed analysis of driver’s gaze characteristics 
compared to observations of head movements from outside the vehicle. It was possible to obtain 
precise data about every part of the environment that people were observing during the entire 
phase of approaching a level crossing. In addition to the eye-tracking data, speeds were recorded 
during the entire approach in order to be able to draw conclusions about the connection between 
the driver’s perceptual processes and their braking behavior.  
In the following section, the most common layouts of level crossing protection will be 
presented, followed by the methodology of the study. Afterwards, the main results concerning the 
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eye-tracking and driving data will be presented. Finally, the implications of the results are 
discussed. 
2. Level crossing layout in Germany 
If you compare the safety layout of level crossings in different countries, it becomes 
apparent that they have a lot of characteristics in common. Nevertheless, there are some 
differences in the safety layout between different countries. Since the study described in this 
article was conducted in Germany, a short overview of the most common protective elements that 
are used at German level crossings is provided in table 1.  
Distance in 
front of the 
level crossing 
Signs and technical 
elements 
Description 
240 meters 
 
Either sign 150 (left), announcing a level 
crossing in general or sign 151, announcing a 
level crossing with barriers is set up. (In the 
future only sign 151 will be used.) 
240 meters 
 Sign 153, depicting 240m distance to the 
level crossing. Either sign 150 or sign 151 is 
installed above it. It should be located on 
both sides of the road. 
160 meters 
 Sign 159, depicting 160m left to the level 
crossing. It should be located on both sides of 
the road. 
80 meters 
 Sign 162, depicting 80m left to the level 
crossing. It should be located on both sides of 
the road. 
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In the 
immediate 
vicinity of the 
level crossing 
        
Sign 201, the “St Andrew’s Cross”, signaling 
the right of way of the railway traffic. It 
should be located on both sides of the road. 
In the 
immediate 
vicinity of the 
level crossing 
        
Flashing red light signal (not built anymore) 
and yellow-red permanent light signal. When 
these light signals are active the road traffic 
has to stop until they are turned off. 
In the 
immediate 
vicinity of the 
level crossing 
 
Half barrier, closing the driving lane, usually 
combined with a yellow-red light signal. 
Implemented on both sides of the rail. 
In the 
immediate 
vicinity of the 
level crossing 
 
Full barriers, closing the entire width of the 
road. Can be combined with a light signal. 
Table 1: Protective elements at German level crossings (Giesa & Bald, 2003; Grippenkoven, 
Giesemann & Dietsch, 2012) 
3. METHODS 
In this study, 24 participants (9 females, 15 males) drove a predetermined route through the 
German city of Braunschweig in a car that was especially equipped for research purposes. The 
average age of the participants in the sample was 24.88 years (SD = 4.23 years). On average, 
participants had held their driver’s license for seven years (range: 2 to 15 years; SD = 3.31 years). 
Out of the original sample of 35 participants, eleven participants had to be excluded from the 
analysis because of technical issues that led to poor data quality or because of heavy traffic in the 
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area of the target level crossings. Before the ride, all participants were instructed and the eye-
tracking system was calibrated. This procedure took between ten and 15 minutes. The ride itself 
took approximately 40 minutes. During the ride each participant passed two railroad level 
crossings. The first of these level crossings was a level crossing with passive protection (table 1: 
signs 151, 153, 159, 162 & 201). The second one was an active level crossing with a yellow-red 
light signal system (without barriers). Both level crossings were located in a comparable, 
suburban environment. The driving time between both level crossings was approximately ten 
minutes. The maximum speed allowed on the roads leading towards both level crossings was 50 
km/h (= 31.07 mph). An experimenter was present in the back seat of the test vehicle during the 
entire ride. In order to be able to compare the results across all participants and rule out 
disturbing influences, the study was highly standardized. As part of the standardization, 
participants who followed another car that was driving in front of them on the last 400 meters 
(437.4 yards) in front of the level crossing were not included in the data analysis as well as 
participants that were followed by another car driving closely behind them. This strict exclusion 
was necessary because drivers’ attention and behavior is influenced by other road users. Drivers 
tend to link their behavior to the car that they are following (van der Horst & Wilmink, 1986). In 
order to avoid confounding the results with participants that relate their behavior to drivers in 
front of them or behind them, data were only included in the analysis for participants that 
approached the level crossing without traffic on either lane. Since the aim of the study was to 
obtain insights into drivers’ natural behavior around level crossings, a cover story was used. 
Participants were told that the study was an explorative study about their usual driving behavior 
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in normal road traffic. Participants had to be unaware of the fact that the study was actually about 
level crossings because their visual attention and driving behavior would otherwise have been 
biased. In order to avoid a situation in which the drivers’ expectations influence their attention 
and driving behavior, it was ensured that no participant knew the level crossings that were passed 
during the study. To control for that, only participants that did not live near the level crossings 
were selected to participate in the study. After the ride, participants also had to fill in a survey 
with pictures of level crossings (including the level crossings that they crossed during the ride 
before). They had to indicate whether they knew the level crossings on the pictures before the 
experiment. None of the participants were familiar with the two target level crossings in the 
experiment.  
Eye-tracking data were recorded to obtain a comprehensive overview of participants’ 
visual perception. The eye-tracking technique allows for continuous reconstruction of the specific 
location in the environment the driver is looking at in each moment during the entire ride. The 
duration of a visual fixation can serve as an indicator of the duration of mental processing of an 
object in the driving environment. In this study a head-mounted eye tracker from the 
manufacturer SMI was used. This eye-tracking system consists of small cameras built into 
comfortable glasses which are directed to the eyes of the participant. A high-resolution camera 
films the visual field in the driving environment. The eye tracker looks and feels like ordinary 
glasses when worn and does not restrict the driver’s normal visual field. 
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Driving data were recorded with an onboard recording unit in the experimental vehicle 
that allows analysis of the deceleration in front of the two level crossings. In order to be able to 
determine the speed at an exact position in the analysis afterwards, the GPS position of the car 
was continuously traced. After finishing the ride, all participants had to complete a short 
questionnaire that examined their knowledge about level crossings. Afterwards people were 
debriefed about the real purpose of the study and financially rewarded for their participation with 
20€. 
4. Results 
In this section, the results of the eye-tracking data will be reported first. Then the results from 
the driving data will be presented. The recorded set of eye-tracking data was analyzed for a 
defined interval. This interval ranged from the point at which the first sign of the level crossing 
safety layout could be seen until the participants crossed the rails. In the introduction of this 
paper, we cited two explanations from Wigglesworth (1978) which he assumed to account for 
drivers not engaging in the search for a train at level crossings. The first was drivers’ 
unawareness of the existence of the level crossing that can be caused by overlooking signs that 
announce the level crossing. The second explanation was that people have false expectations 
about level crossings or retrieve faulty mental models from their long-term memory. The eye-
tracking data for the relevant interval of the approach towards the level crossing in the current 
experiment was systematically reviewed in order to examine the correctness of Wigglesworth’s 
(1978) two explanations.  
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The first hypothesis was that drivers are not aware of the existence of a level crossing because 
they fail to perceive it or the signs announcing it. Explorative checks were made as to whether the 
participants in the sample generally perceive (parts of) the protective layout at both level 
crossings or not and how long elements are fixated upon. The criterion for a fixation to be 
counted was a visual focus on an area of interest that lasted longer than 120ms. This is slightly 
longer than the minimum fixation duration of 100ms that is recommended for eye-tracking 
research in the automotive context by Seifert, Rötting & Jung (2001).  
In the case of the passive level crossing, an average of 15% of the total fixation time during 
the approach was spent fixating upon level-crossing-related signs. For the active level crossing 
including the yellow-red light signaling system, the fixations on signs and signals accounted for 
19.9% of the total fixation time. For both level crossings, all of the participants in the sample 
visually fixated upon at least some of the signs. A detailed overview of the average percentage of 
the total fixation times for the relevant signs during approach towards the level crossings is given 
in table 2. The hypothesis was tested as to whether the presence of a light signal leads to a 
difference in the total fixation duration for the level crossings signs in comparison to a passive 
level crossing (H0: There is no difference in fixation duration; HA: There is a difference in 
fixation duration). Comparing the total fixation duration on the signs at the two level crossings 
that were crossed in the study with a paired-samples t-test, no significant statistical difference 
could be found for the tested sample (t = 1.13, df = 23, p = 0.27; HA has to be rejected in favor of 
H0). 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Transportation Safety & 
Security on 05 Nov 2015, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19439962.2015.1046620. 
 
 
Table 2: Visual fixation of relevant elements at the level crossings in the study 
Wigglesworth’s (1978) second hypothesis was that drivers detect the level crossing, but form 
false expectations because of faulty mental models about level crossings or a lack of knowledge. 
Since all of the participants in the sample displayed fixations on signs announcing the level 
crossings, the next step during the approach towards the level crossing (given correct scripts and 
mental models) would be to search for a train that could be approaching from the left or right. 
Based on the findings by Wigglesworth (1978), it was assumed that in the case of the active level 
crossing, fewer people would search for an oncoming train compared to the passive level crossing 
because of a high level of trust in the light signals as a sufficient source of information. The eye-
tracking data were analyzed for the searching behavior for a potentially oncoming train in front of 
the level crossing. In the cases of both level crossings that were crossed in the experiment, a 
similarly high number of participants did not check for a train that could be approaching (passive 
level crossing: 16 out of 24; active level crossing: 15 out of 24). In the case of the level crossing 
Average percentage of total 
fixation 
duration during approach 
Number of persons that showed 
 at least one fixation 
 Passive 
level crossing 
Active level 
crossing  
with light signal 
Passive 
level crossing 
Active level 
crossing  
with light signal 
Train sign at 240m 3.6% 0.9% 18 9 
St Andrew's cross 1.7% 2.3% 16 13 
Light signal --- 5.6% --- 19 
Other level crossing 
related signs 9.7% 11.1% 24 24 
Road and 
environment 85% 80.1% 24 24 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Transportation Safety & 
Security on 05 Nov 2015, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19439962.2015.1046620. 
 
 
with light signals, this result can be interpreted in relation to the proportion of fixations on the 
light signals that provide the necessary information about an oncoming train. In the case of the 
passive level crossing, the insufficient searches made by two-thirds of the participants for an 
approaching train are more dangerous. No additional visual information exists to tell a driver 
whether a train is coming or not. 
With regard to the driving data, it was assumed that participants would show a stronger 
deceleration at a passive level crossing compared to an active level crossing because of the 
absence of an active warning system and the resulting stronger necessity for an active search for a 
train. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the participant’s speed on the last meter before 
crossing the rails of both level crossings (H0: There is no difference in the speed; HA: Drivers are 
slower in front of the passive level crossing than in front of the active level crossing). A paired 
sample t-test was calculated to test this hypothesis. In front of the passive level crossing, drivers 
slowed down to 38.6 km/h (23.98 mph) on average. The speed was reduced to 40.2 km/h in front 
of the active level crossing. This difference did not reach statistical significance (t = -.982, df = 
23, p = .336; HA has to be rejected in favor of H0).  
Overall driving data (table 3) reveal that the participants in the sample slightly reduced the 
speed of the test vehicle during the approach towards the railway crossing. The initial speed 
reductions usually took place around 80 to 50 meters (87.5 to 54.7 yds.) in front of the level 
crossing. At a speed limit of 50 km/h (31.07 mph), participants reduced their speed on average to 
38.6 km/h (23.98 mph) before they passed the passive level crossing. In the case of the level 
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crossing with light signals they reduced their speed on average to 40.2 km/h (24.98 mph) when 
they passed it.  
 
Table 3: Driving behavior of the participants 
In a post-hoc analysis, the sample was divided into two subsamples of people that checked 
for a train and people that did not. The participants who checked the rails for an oncoming train 
crossed the passive level crossing at an average speed of 33.2 km/h (20.63 mph) and the level 
crossing with light signals at an average speed of 33.5 km/h (20.82 mph). The speed of 
participants who did not check for an oncoming train was significantly higher at both level 
crossings. Their speed at the passive level crossing was 41.9 km/h (26.04 mph) and 43.5 km/h at 
the level crossing with light signals (26.75 mph). A graphical overview of the deceleration during 
the last 240m of the approach towards both level crossings is given in figures 2 + 3. An analysis 
of variance with repeated measures showed that the measured speed at the level crossing 
significantly differed between the participants who checked for a train compared to those who did 
Level crossing (LX) Maximum 
speed allowed 
Average speed 
just before 
crossing   
Average speed 
of people that 
looked if a 
train is coming  
Average speed 
of people that 
did not look if 
a train is 
coming  
Passive LX km/h 50 38.6 33.2  41.9 
mph 31.07 23.98  20.63 26.04  
Active LX 
with light 
signal 
km/h 50 40.2 33.5 43.5 
mph 31.07 24.98  20.82  26.75 
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not check, both for the passive level crossing (F = 7.08, df = 1.15, p < 0.05) and for the level 
crossing with light signals (F = 17.53, df = 1.67, p < 0.01).  
 
Figure 2: Deceleration of participants at the passive level crossing. 
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Figure 3: Deceleration of participants at the active level crossing with light signals  
5. Discussion 
The aim of the study was to describe and compare driver behavior at two different level 
crossings. Results based on eye-tracking data and driving data from an analysis involving 24 
participants were presented. The level crossing environment requires distinct steps of information 
processing a driver has to run through, starting with the detection of elements that announce the 
level crossing via the retrieval of schemas and scripts connected to level crossings through to the 
formation of an action plan, like looking and listening if there is evidence of an oncoming train 
and stopping if necessary. 
As indicated by the eye-tracking data in this study, all participants perceived at least parts of 
the safety layout announcing the level crossing. An average of 15% of the fixation time was spent 
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on level crossing signs during the approach towards the passive level crossing. 19.9% of the total 
fixation duration was spent fixating upon signs and signals in the case of the active level crossing. 
Given an approach time of 20 – 25 seconds, this fixation percentage appears sufficient for a 
driver to notice that he is heading towards a level crossing. Nevertheless, most of the drivers in 
the sample did not show adequate searching behavior. Despite the fact that drivers looked at the 
signs, two-thirds of them subsequently did not look for an oncoming train and reduced the speed 
only slightly. In terms of the model of information processing (Wickens & Hollands, 1999), it 
can be concluded that the problem of maladaptive behavior in the case of both level crossings is 
not a problem of perception or overlooking. It rather appears that many of the participants do not 
know how to behave when facing signs and signals that announce a level crossing because they 
have neither proper mental models nor scripts that can be applied when perceiving, for example, 
a St Andrew’s cross. This conclusion is in line with the second thesis by Wigglesworth that was 
mentioned in the introduction of this article. However, a possible alternative explanation that 
should not be ruled out is that drivers could have committed a kind of looked-but-failed-to-see 
error (in absence of an immediate threat) as described by Rudin-Brown, French-St. George and 
Stuart (2014). It is possible that signs that were fixated upon were only processed in a premature 
sensory stage but did not reach deeper stages of processing like the identification and the retrieval 
of schemas and scripts connected to it. 
With regard to the driving data, it should be noted that the minimal braking deceleration a car 
needs to be capable of in order to obtain a vehicle registration in Germany is 5.0 m/s2 (Federal 
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Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 2012). If you assume a more realistic braking 
deceleration value between -6.5m/s2 and -7.5m/s2 km/h for a car that is braking on a dry street 
and add a reaction time of one second, an overall stopping distance of 22.06m – 20.67m results 
for a car travelling with a speed of 41.9 km/h (as in the case of participants that did not look for 
an oncoming train at the passive level crossing in this study). At the passive level crossing passed 
during the ride in this study, a driver is able to detect a train at the earliest from a distance of 
20m. This means that, given their average speed of 41.9 km/h, drivers in the sample that did not 
actively search for a train would not have been able to stop in front of the rails. Drivers that 
searched for a train at the passive level crossing travelled with a speed of 33.5 km/h and would 
have needed an overall stopping distance of 15.76m-15.08m (given a braking deceleration of -
6.5m/s2 and -7.5m/s2). They would have been able to brake and stop in front of the level crossing. 
The insufficient speed reduction and deficient gaze patterns that were found for the two-thirds of 
the participants that did not search for a train could lead to dangerous situations in the case of an 
oncoming train. This type of behavior is a potential cause of accidents at passive level crossings. 
Based on the results, it has to be questioned if people have a proper knowledge of level-
crossing-related signs, for example the meaning of the St Andrew’s cross as an indicator for the 
train’s right of way. Drivers are used to passing road intersections and looking out for cars 
coming from the left or right in order to draw conclusions about the right of way. The same 
behavioral patterns are required at a railway level crossing. Nevertheless, a majority of people do 
not appear to treat a level crossing like an intersection in road traffic. From this perspective it 
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appears reasonable to allow the implementation of stop signs at level crossings in countries where 
they are still forbidden. Even if people do not stop, most drivers know from their experience in 
road traffic that a stop sign announces a dangerous crossing. Drivers would probably at least look 
for a potential hazard even if they do not stop in the absence of a hazard. Besides considerations 
about level-crossing-related signs, more emphasis has to be placed on the topic of level crossings 
in driving lessons. With an average age of 24.8 years, it can be assumed that many participants in 
the sample of this study have undergone driving lessons quite recently. However, the mental 
scripts that participants have acquired about the mandatory behavior at level crossings appear to 
have faded in many cases. Given the findings of this study, the extent to which the topic of level 
crossings is taught in driving schools should be reconsidered. 
 
Additional technological measures that are capable of enhancing the driver’s 
understanding of how to behave at level crossings should be implemented. If people are not used 
to slowing down and searching for a train that could be approaching at a level crossing, it could 
for example be useful to have a vehicle assistance system to inform drivers about what to do 
when approaching the level crossing (e.g. “slow down and look for a train”). Another way of 
enhancing safety lies in the design of the level crossing itself. If the signs and signals are not 
meaningful enough for drivers, a level crossing could be designed in a way that makes people 
engage in the correct action automatically. A boom barrier for example is a physical obstacle that 
can cause damage to you and your car and is easily understandable without having to realize that 
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the barrier belongs to a railway level crossing. Of course, it would be expensive to build 
automatic full-barrier systems in front of every single level crossing, but there are also cheaper 
ways of making people automatically engage in the correct behavior at a level crossing and these 
should be considered to to make level crossings safer. Speed bumps or rumble strips for example 
are often discussed in the literature (Gates, Qin, & Noyce, 2008; Radalj & Kidd, 2005; 
Thompson, Burris, & Carlson, 2006) and can be helpful in making people reduce their speed. 
Even without knowing that they are reducing their speed for the sake of a level crossing ahead, a 
lower speed raises the chances of detecting a train and being able to stop in front of the level 
crossing. Nevertheless, rumble strips are not capable of making people directly watch out for an 
oncoming train. It is unlikely that a mental connection between a feeling of vibration induced by 
rumble strips and the need to engage in a search for a train will be formed by the driver. 
Therefore, additional measures should be considered that make people automatically direct their 
attention to their periphery and into the direction of the tracks. Flashing lights in the periphery of 
the driver’s visual field that are located next to the tracks could be a solution. An abrupt stimulus 
onset like a strobe light could draw the driver’s attention to the source of the stimulus, especially 
in the visual periphery (Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). The idea 
of installing strobe lights at the front of trains to facilitate their detection for road users was 
reported by Caird, Creaser, Edwards and Dewar (2002) and appears reasonable in the light of 
findings concerning mechanisms of human attention. Strobe lights do not necessarily have to be 
installed on trains, they could also be located in a region around 30 – 50m to the left and right of 
level crossings. These lights could be triggered for example by a light barrier sensor or ultrasonic 
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sensor located next to the street. If a car passes the sensor, the flashing lights can be turned on in 
order to attract the driver’s attention to the left and the right, the directions a train could come 
from. Further research on the topic of driver’s attention at level crossings should be conducted, 
especially on the bottom-up approach of drawing driver’s attention to areas a train could come 
from.  
As in many field studies, there are limitations to this study that have to be mentioned. For 
a comparison of the attentional processes during the approach of two different level crossings, in 
a within-subjects design, a sample size of 24 participants appears acceptable. Still, a larger 
sample size with a more heterogeneous age structure would have been desirable. Results have to 
be treated with caution when generalizing the findings from this study to the overall driving 
population. Still, this study demonstrated that accidents at level crossing are not a simple problem 
caused by inattentive drivers. Many drivers in fact do pay attention to the safety layout at level 
crossings, they simply do not derive the right behavioral patterns from it. The combination of 
eye-tracking data and driving data in a real-world driving setting is well suited to the analysis of 
driver behavior at level crossings. This method is recommended for future studies with larger 
sample sizes that address safety measures aiming at raising the driver’s level of attention around 
level crossings.  
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